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CYCLICAL TAX ENFORCEMENT
JOSÉ M DURÁN-CABRÉ, ALEJANDRO ESTELLER-MORÉ and LUCA SALVADORI∗
We wonder whether tax enforcement varies along the economic cycle and aim
at answering that question from a positive perspective by means of survey data
for the Spanish case (1994–2015). According to a fiscal capacity argument, tax
enforcement might be stronger in times of crisis (counter-cyclical), but if the tax
administration prioritizes taxpayers’ welfare over public revenue, enforcement might be
slacker (procyclical). We find tax enforcement is not immune to the state of the economy.
In particular, it presents a prevailing counter-cyclical trend, but in presence of a severe
economic crisis it turns out to be procyclical. (JEL D78, H12, H26, H83)
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic downturn associated with the
global financial crisis caused a significant fall
in tax revenues in many countries. In advanced
economies, fiscal deficit increased by 2.5% of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 and by
about 5% in 2009, provoking serious concern
about the need to substantially lower their deficits
to be able to control their debt-to-GDP ratios
(IMF 2010). In response, between 2008 and 2013,
many countries augmented the value-added tax
(VAT) rates (e.g., 19 out of the 28 EU countries
raised the general rate, with an average increase
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of 3 percentage points) and even some increased
top marginal personal income tax rates (e.g., 13
out of the 28 EU, with an average increase of
about 6 percentage points). But given the multi-
dimensional nature of tax systems, enforcement
is another parameter in the hands of the public
sector—through its tax administration—to col-
lect more revenues (Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014).
In other words, if tax administrators act as rev-
enue maximizers, they should increase enforce-
ment efforts; that is, they should have played a
counter-cyclical role.11
However, in a severe economic recession
and with financial credit severely constrained,
taxpayers’ aggregate welfare likely will be
declining. If tax administrations prioritize tax-
payers’ welfare over revenue collection, they
1. Analyzing the finances of the southern European coun-
tries, The Economist indicated “Now that these countries are
trying to get their finances in order, bringing down rates of tax
evasion is a high priority” (August 12, 2010). Between 2010
and 2012, the annual Eurostat publication Taxation Trends in
the European Union indicates that southern European coun-
tries (e.g., Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) but also other Euro-
pean governments (e.g., Belgium, Bulgaria, Norway) intro-
duced changes in the administration of taxes in order to fight
against tax evasion and raise revenues.
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should lessen enforcement and play a procyclical
role. In other words, a procyclical tax agency
will reduce the level of enforcement during a
time when credit-constrained taxpayers may
be tempted to use tax evasion as an alternative
source of finance, as they may perceive the risks
of tax evasion (penalties) much smaller than the
potential gains of avoiding bankruptcy (see e.g.,
Brondolo 2009). Regarding taxpayers’ behavior,
in a recent paper, Alm, Liu, and Zhang (2019)
analyze whether the financial constraints faced
by a firm increase the extent of tax evasion
and, working with a survey of firms from 27
transitional countries, find evidence that more
financially constrained firms are more likely to
be involved in tax evasion activities. Similarly,
Richardson, Taylor, and Lanis (2015), based
on a sample of 203 publicly-listed Australian
firms covering the 2006–2010 period, show
that firms’ financial distress is significantly and
positively associated with tax avoidance across
several proxy measures of tax avoidance and
financial distress.
This idea was first analyzed by Andreoni
(1992) for individuals in a theoretical model
in which the tax administration could act as
a last-resort lender (“the tax agency as a loan
shark”). When taxpayers face binding financial
constraints, they may consider evading taxes to
smooth consumption along time. They would do
so even if evasion were not a fair gamble, that
is, the expected return from evasion was nega-
tive. Only severely financial constrained taxpay-
ers would act like this, something very relevant
at the aggregate level in times of crisis. The role
of tax evasion as a substitute for loans was also
analyzed by Fishlow and Friedman (1994), in a
paper where they focus on the public resort of
tax evasion in developing countries. They use a
theoretical model of intertemporal consumption
that characterizes the behavior of taxpayers in a
financially constrained economy and show that
negative shocks over current income raise eva-
sion. Agents use evasion to substitute for loans
in economies where credit is not available.
The aim of this paper is to analyze tax enforce-
ment over the economic cycle. We do so by means
of ordered response models applied to Spanish
data extracted from repeated surveys and other
sources. In particular, we employ a measure of
tax enforcement as it is perceived by individ-
uals and try to identify what part of its vari-
ation along the economic cycle is due to the
annual variation in the effort of the administra-
tion. This entails isolating potential unobserved
confounders that could vary over the cycle. We
identify two dimensions of the perceived enforce-
ment by individuals that can act in this way.
Namely, these are individual risk perception and
normative beliefs. We propose an identification
strategy to deal with these two confounders.
According to our empirical results, perceived
tax enforcement presents a prevailing counter-
cyclical trend, but becomes procyclical in pres-
ence of severe economic downturns. This is the
main contribution of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II sets the main hypotheses concerning
the impact of the cycle on tax enforcement;
Section III presents the empirical strategy we
employ to test those hypotheses; Section IV
presents the results of the empirical analysis, and
Section V concludes. An online appendix reports
the results of robustness analyses.
II. TAX ENFORCEMENT ALONG THE ECONOMIC
CYCLE
Might tax enforcement be influenced by eco-
nomic cycles and particularly by a severe eco-
nomic downturn? This is the main research ques-
tion we pose. To counteract the negative macroe-
conomic effects of a downturn, tax policy should
be counter-cyclical. Nonetheless, tax revenues
also vary endogenously with changes due to fac-
tors not under the control of policymakers, such
as changes in income distribution or changes in
agents’ behavior over the economic cycle (Vegh
and Vuletin 2015).
Likewise, we also know the limits of fiscal pol-
icy when the public debt-to-GDP ratio is high
(Ghosh et al. 2013), while some authors sim-
ply cast doubts on the effectiveness of that pol-
icy (Ramey and Zuvairy 2018), or suggest their
impact—through the estimated value of the fis-
cal multipliers—is contingent on the state of the
economy (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012).
Being aware of those potential limitations, not
all fiscal instruments might be equally effective
at stabilizing the economy (Wren-Lewis 2010).
Under this context, tax enforcement might be a
peculiar instrument, which to our knowledge has
never been formally considered as a potential tool
for stabilization purposes.
The most common approach sees tax admin-
istration as a public agency whose aim is maxi-
mizing tax revenues given a certain budget (e.g.,
Shaw, Slemrod, and Whiting 2009; Slemrod and
Yitzhaki 1987, 2002). But, as we said before,
tax enforcement policies carried out by the tax
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administration might be linked to the economic
cycle. Furthermore, recent empirical studies sug-
gest that political as well as budgetary variables
play a role in determining tax administration’s
enforcement efforts (see, e.g., Baretti, Huber, and
Lichtblau 2002; Bönke, Jochimsen, and Schröder
2017; Esteller-Moré 2005, 2011; Young, Reksu-
lak, and Shughart II 2001).
A strand of literature underlines the institu-
tional capacity of countries to raise revenues,
which includes an administration for the col-
lection of taxes and the monitoring of compli-
ance (Besley and Persson 2009). From a dynamic
perspective, tax administration should then play
a counter-cyclical role, that is, under a nega-
tive external shock (e.g., an economic downturn),
tax enforcement should be reinforced.2 This idea
seems to be confirmed in a related empirical study
by Chen (2017) for China: a revenue loss (in that
case, the abolition of a local tax) was largely off-
set by tougher tax enforcement. This evidence
confirms enforcement may be used by tax author-
ities as an instrument to counteract revenue losses
due to a negative shock. However, Chen considers
an isolated shock, and the scarce empirical lit-
erature does not address the potential existence
of a fiscal capacity argument in the setting of
enforcement along the economic cycle. The con-
text caused by the economic downturn associated
with the global financial crisis, with individu-
als and companies facing very important finan-
cial constraints, offers the opportunity to analyze
the role of tax administration over the economic
cycle.3
Brondolo (2009) argues tax enforcement has
attractive features at stabilizing the economy,
2. Kuehn (2014) provides a model for the informal econ-
omy in high-income countries and runs an interesting policy
experiment with Spain and other Southern European coun-
tries: raising the enforcement standards to the Finnish level
(the best governance quality observed) would reduce the
informal economy in Spain close to 8 percentage points and
increase tax revenues by 7%. In order to provide a notion for
the benefits of the policy, Kuehn assesses that the increase
in tax collection costs that would leave Spain indifferent
between adopting or not adopting the policy in terms of tax
revenue is 779%. Thus, the potential benefits of increasing
enforcement in Spain would be large.
3. Almost 40% of the 49 revenue bodies analyzed by
the OECD, reported an increase in the aggregate value of
their debt inventory over the years 2007 to 2009 exceeding
20%, and for 13 revenue bodies, this increase exceeded 40%
(OECD 2011). These are unpaid debts, that is, tax liabilities
recognized by taxpayers but not paid. After 2009 peak, aver-
age tax debt levels decreased, but in 2011 it remained in excess
of 20% of the average reported for 2007. The incidence varied
enormously across countries and in eight OECD countries the
level remained in 2011 over 50% their level in 2007 (OECD
2013).
especially where formal automatic stabilizers are
weak. In particular, he cites two peculiar features:
(1) it is relative quick acting through it, as no
legislative action is necessary and (2) it might
be targeted to those more in need, if changes in
the level of tax evasion indicates changing liquid-
ity constraints among taxpayers. In other words,
tax administration could be an expeditious tool
to deal with asymmetric shocks within a country.
We suspect that the Spanish tax administration4
might have employed tax enforcement to react
to regional sources of heterogeneity in the eco-
nomic cycle.
This author also stresses negative features:
it lacks transparency, it might be unfair and
distortionary, and—in a similar vein as a “tax
amnesty”5 —it might make lose credibility to the
administration. That is why, Brondolo proposes a
detailed practical strategy for tax administrations
to contain a potential rise in noncompliance dur-
ing an economic crisis.6
All in all, in front of an economic downturn
the tax administration can react as follows:
(i) Strengthening tax enforcement, or tax
capacity argument (Besley and Persson 2009).
This would imply tax enforcement is counter-
cyclical and would be raised in order to over-
come the financial constraints of public finances
in times of crisis.
(ii) Weakening tax enforcement. If the tax
administration prioritizes taxpayers’ welfare over
the revenue, enforcement would be procyclical as
to smooth taxpayers’ financial shocks; or
(iii) Tax enforcement is independent of the
state of the economy. This is the implicit assump-
tion made by the economic literature.
In this paper, we do not pretend to normatively
assess which one of the three options is the opti-
mal one, but to infer whether tax enforcement is
4. In Spain, tax administration tasks are shared by the
national tax agency (AEAT) and the tax agency of each
Spanish region (the so-called autonomous communities—AC
henceforth). The AEAT is responsible for the effective appli-
cation of the main national taxes, such as personal income tax,
value added tax and corporate income tax. Regional tax agen-
cies are responsible for the enforcement of annual wealth tax,
inheritance and gift tax and tax on wealth transfers, in addition
to other minor regional taxes. Therefore, the national agency
plays a much more significant role than regional agencies.
5. See, though, Andreoni (1991) where he develops a
theoretical framework where a “tax amnesty” may increase
both efficiency and equity of the tax system.
6. Pappa, Sajedi, and Vella (2015) analyze how fiscal con-
solidation is affected by the extent of evasion and corruption.
That is, they relate fiscal policy to compliance, but take this
latter element as given.
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influenced by economic cycles. Before moving to
the next section, where we will carefully explain
our identification procedure, note that the cycli-
cal characterization of enforcement might also
depend on how severe the economic crisis is. That
is, the relationship between economic shock and
enforcement could be nonlinear. We will also take
this into account in our empirical framework.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The conceptual framework just described
presents interesting and novel hypotheses about
the evolution of tax enforcement along the
economic cycle that require empirical testing.
Next, we present the employed methodology to
test this framework, discuss our identification
strategy, and finally present and comment on the
main results.
A. The Empirical Framework
In order to test the hypotheses raised about
the level of tax enforcement along the economic
cycle, we employ enforcement as it is perceived
by individuals in Spain.7 This is our endogenous
variable, which is extracted from the repeated
waves of the survey “Public opinion and fiscal
policy,” conducted annually (1994–2015) and
released by the Spanish Centre of Sociological
Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológi-
cas in Spanish, CIS henceforth). This repeated
cross-section survey reports information on sub-
jective perceptions of the fiscal policy, public pro-
vided goods and services, and other aspects of the
tax system in Spain.
The relevant question used to define the
endogenous variable is the following: “Do
you think the tax administration is currently
taking many/quite a few/a few/very few steps
in its efforts to fight against tax evasion?”8;
7. What matters about the decision to evade is the per-
ception of taxpayers (Slemrod 2019). For instance, Blank
and Levin (2010) show that the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice Tax Division issues a disproportionately large number of
tax enforcement press releases during the weeks immediately
prior to Tax Day (when income tax returns are due) compared
to the rest of the year, with the aim to influence individual
taxpayers’ perceptions and knowledge of the audit probabil-
ity. Hence, this perception might be directly affected by the
actions of the tax administration. In any case, there is vast evi-
dence that individuals tend to overestimate the probability of
their being audited even when fully informed about actual pol-
icy (see e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). We will explain
in the next section how we tackle this issue.
8. The original question in Spanish is “¿Cree Ud. que,
en la actualidad. la Administración hace muchos, bastantes,
this question has remained unchanged over the
1994–2015 period. For any respondent i, in AC
j, in survey year t, we code the answer to this
question into the variable pijt,which is scaled
from very low (1) to very high (4) according to
the answer. Thus, by defining pijt as an ordinal
dependent variable measuring the unobservable
actual perceived tax enforcement of individuals,
p*ijt, we can design an ordered response model
(see, e.g., Wooldridge 2002, 504–9)9:









1 if p∗ijt ≤ ω1
2 if ω1 < p∗ijt ≤ ω2
3 if ω2 < p∗ijt ≤ ω3
4 if p∗ijt > ω3
where ECjt is a proxy of the AC-specific eco-
nomic cycle at time t. In particular, we alterna-
tively employ the GDP of the AC j during year
t (GDPjt) or the level of unemployment in AC
j during year t (Unemploymentjt). Thus, a low
value of GDPjt with respect to its potential long-
run level—implicitly accounted for through AC
fixed effects—implies an economic downturn.
The symmetric reasoning holds when Unemploy-
mentjt is employed as a proxy for the economic
cycle. Therefore, we identify a counter-cyclical
perceived tax enforcement with a negative (posi-
tive) sign when ECjt is proxied by GDPjt (Unem-
ploymentjt).
Since socioeconomic information about the
respondents is also included in the survey, we
collect this information in vector Yijt to con-
trol for personal characteristics, while Xjt is a
vector collecting other AC-specific relevant vari-
ables. We discuss in detail all these variables
pocos o muy pocos esfuerzos para luchar contra el fraude
fiscal?” (see e.g., question n. 21 of the survey n. 2,994 released
in 2013, as the numbering of the questions might change from
year to year).
9. Since the dependent variable is defined as an ordinal
discrete ranking, employing an ordered response model is
the most appropriate estimation strategy. Indeed, as Greene
(2002) states “although the outcome is discrete, the multino-
mial logit or probit model would fail to account for the ordinal
nature of the dependent variable. Ordinary regression anal-
ysis would err in the opposite direction, however. Take the
outcome of an opinion survey. If the responses are coded 0,
1, 2, 3, or 4, then linear regression would treat the difference
between a 4 and a 3 the same as that between a 3 and a 2,
whereas in fact they are only a ranking.” (see e.g., Greene
2002, 736). However, as a robustness check we also repli-
cate the analysis by estimating an OLS model (see the online
Appendix S1).
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in Section III.B. Finally, we account for fixed
effects (𝜗j), time effects (𝜏 t) and 𝜖ijt is the error
term. We estimate the coefficients as well as
the cut-points in Equation (1) through an ordered
probit model10 by means of maximum likeli-
hood technique.
By estimating (1), we can evaluate the pooled
effect of the economic cycle on tax enforcement.
This effect could vary depending on the sever-
ity of the economic shocks. In order to appreci-
ate this potential change in the response of tax
enforcement, we employ a linear spline approach
(see e.g., Poirier and Garber 1974; Gould 1993;
or Johnston and DiNardo 1997) by specifying the
relationship between p*ijt and ECjt as a piece-
wise seamless compound linear function. In other
words, the relationship between p*ijt and ECjt
is estimated as a function composed of linear
segments that meet at the knots. The following
expression describes such specification:







β1ECjt + a1 if ECjt ≤ knot1
β2ECjt+a2 if knot1<ECjt ≤ knot2









1 if p∗ijt ≤ ω1
2 if ω1 < p∗ijt ≤ ω2
3 if ω2 < p∗ijt ≤ ω3
4 if p∗ijt > ω3
.
The knots are alternatively equally spaced
over the range of ECjt or are placed at convenient
percentiles of ECjt in order to identify severe eco-
nomic downturns by considering extreme values
of ECjt. Specifically, we set knot1 and knot2 at
the first and the fifth percentiles of GDPjt or at
the 95th and 99th percentiles of Unemploymentjt.
Alternatively, we also employ another standard
approach to identify nonlinearity that consists of
including quadratic and cubic terms of ECjt in
the regression model. This methodology is rep-
resented by:
p∗ijt = β1ECjt + β2(ECjt)2+ β3(ECjt)3
+ Yijt𝛙 + Xjt𝛂 + ϑj + τt + ϵijt
10. The difference between an ordered probit and an
ordered logit model regards the distribution of 𝜀ijt. As main
strategy, by employing an ordered probit model, we are
assuming a normal distribution of the error term. We also
replicate the analysis assuming a logistic distribution, that is,









1 if p∗ijt ≤ ω1
2 if ω1 < p∗ijt ≤ ω2
3 if ω2 < p∗ijt ≤ ω3
4 if p∗ijt > ω3
.
Since nonlinear and linear terms are highly
correlated and there is the risk of getting
inflated standard errors, we orthogonalize the
ECjt polynomial variables (Sribney 1995).
In the next section, we discuss our identifica-
tion strategy.
B. Identification Strategy
Figure 1 shows the answers given by citizens
to the question employed to define our endoge-
nous variable. One can observe how this variable
falls since 2009, that is, at the start of the finan-
cial crisis with a lag and, then, goes up again
moderately from the beginning of the economic
recovery. Thus, perceived enforcement shows a
cyclical pattern, in particular as a consequence of
the Great Recession.
Since we aim at estimating the potential tax
enforcement response to asymmetric shocks at
the regional level, we plot in Figure 2 each AC-
specific economic cycle11 vis-à-vis the average
evolution of our endogenous variable; we then
show the correlation coefficient between the two
series. These trends are obtained without control-
ling for any potential confounder and thus sim-
ple correlations cannot uncover a causal effect.
Nevertheless, we can observe variation across
regions. In particular, in half of them there is a
prevailing procyclical trend, while in the rest the
trend is counter-cyclical. Given this first graph-
ical evidence, we aim at identifying the causal
impact of the cycle on enforcement in a robust
way as we explain next.
Our endogenous variable is not a direct
description of the real efforts carried out by the
tax administration.12 Part of its variation along
11. The AC-specific trend in the economic cycle is mea-
sured as the residual part of the variation of the regional GDP
measured in logs which is not explained by the variation in
logs of the national GDP and an AC-specific constant.
12. There is no data on the number of audits performed
by tax authorities at regional level. We have data on the total
number of employees of the tax administration in both AC-
specific tax agencies and regional offices of the national tax
authority, but we cannot disaggregate this data by function.
Thus, this data does not seem to be a good proxy for tax
enforcement but rather a measure of the size of each tax
agency in any AC and year. Therefore, we employ this data to
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FIGURE 1
Average pijt Variability along Time by AC.
Note: y-axis represents the average score of pijt
time can certainly be explained by how the actual
policy implemented by the administration varies
year-to-year. However, given the survey nature
of the variable, it might also vary along time due
to the variation of individual risk perception even
if efforts carried out by the tax administration do
not change (see fn. 7); the response could also
be normative, that is, what level of enforcement
the interviewed thinks should hold at that par-
ticular time. These last two dimensions are the
individual component of p*ijt; in the regression,
we will include individual variables to control
for those factors.
Nonetheless, both the actual policy dimension
and the individual one might be subject to dif-
ferent types of fluctuations along the economic
cycle. Indeed, both factors can be broken down
into a structural component, a common national
cyclical component and an AC-specific cyclical
define a variable controlling for the tax enforcement capacity
at the regional level (see Section III.C for more details). Given
this limitation, we think that individual perceptions of tax
enforcement policies, once filtered by potential confounders
(i.e., normative beliefs and any particular bias due to risk
aversion) play the right role as endogenous variable.
one. Hence, since we want to identify the impact
of the latter on the actual policy, our strategy
entails first controlling for the structural and com-
mon cyclical components of both dimensions of
p*ijt, and second refining 𝛽 in order to identify
the AC-specific cyclical component of the actual
policy. Indeed, the coefficient 𝛽 in Equation (1)
is picking up the potential effect of the AC-
specific economic cycle on both dimensions of
p*ijt. The main challenge for a correct identifica-
tion is being able to isolate such an effect. Below,
we detail the procedure we employ to deal with
this issue.
Controlling for the Actual Policy: Structural
Component. In Equation (1), by employing fixed
effects (𝜗j) and AC-specific contextual variables
(Xjt), we are already implicitly controlling for
the structural component of the actual policy.
Nevertheless, we strengthen this strategy by
controlling for 5 years fixed effects (i.e., by inter-
acting the AC-specific dummies with 5 years
common trend time dummies) instead of pure
fixed effects. In this way, we should control for
potential changes in the long-term level of ECjt












































































































































































































over time.13 In order to account for AC-specific
contextual variables, vector Xjt includes several
controls. First, we include a set of variables to
identify the regional productive structure through
the percentage composition of the regional gross
value added (GVA).14 Namely, the percentage
of GVA represented by the secondary sector
(without the construction subsector), the per-
centage of GVA represented by the construction
subsector—which has particularly been impor-
tant in Spain—and finally the percentage of GVA
given by the tertiary sector.15 We also include the
regional population in order to account for the
demographic dimension of any AC, and the total
number of employees of the tax administration in
per capita terms in order to account for the capac-
ity of the tax authority to enforce the existing
tax legislation. The regional deficit is included
to synthetically account for budgetary shocks on
both government expenditure and revenues and
to further isolate these shocks from the business
cycle. Finally, we include a dummy variable to
account for the AC electoral cycle and a dummy
identifying whether the AC government stands
on the left of the political spectrum.
Controlling for the Individual Dimension:
Structural Component. In order to account
for the structural component of the individual
dimension of perceived tax enforcement, we
control for individual characteristics of the
respondents (Yijt), which may influence the
risk perception and the enforcement demand of
individuals. We include dummies for female,
13. Alternatively, we also employ as a robustness 3- and
10-year fixed effects. The results of this robustness analysis
are reported in the Appendix S1.
14. These are introduced with 5-year lags in order to
account for the long-run productive structure of any AC. The
regional composition of the GVA does not vary much along
the analyzed period and controlling for the GVA structure
without lags does not qualitatively alter the results which are
available upon request.
15. More precisely, the primary sector includes agricul-
ture, forestry, and fishing. The secondary sector is defined
to include extractive industries; manufacturing industries;
energy industries (electricity, gas, steam, and air condition-
ing); water supply; sanitation, waste management, and decon-
tamination. As mentioned in the text, the construction indus-
try is considered as a subsector a part. Finally, the tertiary
sector includes the following services: wholesale and retail
trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; transport
and storage; hospitality; information and communications;
financial and insurance activities; real estate activities; pro-
fessional, scientific, and technical activities; administrative
activities and auxiliary services; public administration and
defense; compulsory social security; education, health, and
social services activities; artistic, recreational, and entertain-
ment activities; repair of household items; and other services.
head of household, married individual, retired,
self-employed, public employee, left-wing voter,
nationalist voter,16 as well as for the estimated
low unemployment risk (UR, henceforth).17 We
also control for the municipality size,18 age of
the respondent—which are both included also
in squared terms to account for nonlinearity in
their effect—and the educational level attained
by the respondent.
Controlling for the Common Cyclical Compo-
nents (Individual Dimension and Actual Policy).
By employing common time effects (𝜏 t), we
account for the common national cyclical com-
ponent of our endogenous variable. Moreover, in
order to control for the sensitivity of the individ-
ual component of p*ijt on the national economic
cycle, we interact the vector of individual vari-
ables (Yijt) with the common time dummies (𝜏 t)
allowing the risk perception and demand dimen-
sion of p*ijt to sluggishly adjust along the national
economic cycle. Indeed, respondents may answer
differently implicitly showing a different risk
perception/demand of tax enforcement efforts
depending on the national economic cycle.
Controlling for the Individual Dimension: AC-
Specific Cyclical Component. Despite account-
ing for the aforementioned effects, serial corre-
lation might still be present. Indeed, the relation-
ship between the AC-specific economic cycle and
our endogenous variable will capture both the
sensitivity of the tax administration throughout
the economic cycle (i.e., the AC-specific cyclical
component of the actual policy) and the evolution
of individual risk perception/demand throughout
the cycle (i.e., the AC-specific cyclical compo-
nent of the individual dimension of p*ijt). This
means that the estimated effect of the cycle on
the (latent) endogenous variable—the coefficient
𝛽—could be biased.
In order to deal with this issue, we follow
the approach adopted by Backus and Esteller-
Moré (2017). The initial step of this strategy is to
16. The dummy nationalist is defined as equal to 1 if
the respondent voted for one of the nationalist parties of the
historical nationalities recognized in Spain.
17. The methodology employed to estimate UR is
explained below in this section.
18. The municipality size is coded as to rank from
0 to 7 in this way: 0—less or equal to 1,000 inhabi-
tants; 1—1,001 to 2,000 inhabitants; 2—2,001 to 10,000
inhabitants; 3—10,001 to 50,000 inhabitants; 4—50,001
to 100,000 inhabitants; 5—100,001 to 400,000 inhabi-
tants; 6—400,001 to 1,000,000 inhabitants; 7—more than
1,000,000 inhabitants.
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split our sample of surveyed individuals into two
groups, the first one—say group 1—composed
by people whose risk perception and demand of
tax enforcement should not vary along the AC-
specific economic cycle and the second one con-
stituted by the complementary cluster (group 2).
To this end, coherently with Backus and Esteller-
Moré (2017), we provide an estimate of each indi-
vidual’s UR based on their labor market char-
acteristics.19 This is an estimate of an individ-
ual’s idiosyncratic risk of unemployment, scaled
between 0 and 1, and provides us with a proxy of
the impact of the economic cycle on the risk per-
ception/demand of tax enforcement of those indi-
viduals. The rationale is that the higher the UR,
the higher the individual’s exposure to the eco-
nomic cycle, and thus, the higher should be the
potential impact of the economic cycle on her risk
perception and probably demand for tax enforce-
ment. In other words, an individual with low UR
is less likely to change her perception/demand of
tax enforcement along the economic cycle and
thus is more likely to contribute to produce a cor-
rect estimation of 𝛽. We identify the cluster of
individuals whose risk perception and demand of
tax enforcement should not vary along the AC
economic cycle (group 1) by defining the dummy
variable “low UR” equal to 1 if the UR of a cer-
tain individual in year t is lower than the average
UR of that year.20
The following step consists of running sepa-
rate regressions for these two groups, and check-
ing whether there is a statistically significant dif-
ference between the estimated coefficient β̂ for
the two clusters (i.e., whether β̂1 ≠ β̂2 is statisti-
cally significant21). If this is the case, and accord-
ing to our identification strategy, then we should
19. More precisely, we estimate the individual UR by
employing a probit model on a subsample of individu-
als who are employed plus those that are currently unem-
ployed but were employed in previous periods. Specifically,
we establish the relationship URijt = wijt𝝎+ 𝜂ijt where URijt
is a dummy equal to 1 if i is unemployed and 0 if i is
employed, wijt is a vector of i’s employment—or previous
employment—characteristics reported in the CIS surveys.
Those include occupation, industry of employment, and level
of education all interacted with the sector of employment and
year effects, 𝝎 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and
𝜂ijt is the error term. The predicted probabilities ÛRijt, repre-
sent the estimated UR variable (for more details see Backus
and Esteller-Moré 2017, 207). Additionally, we assign a value
equal to zero to the UR of retired individuals.
20. Alternatively, we have also employed the median of
the UR of any year to define the threshold and obtain qualita-
tively the same results, which are available upon request.
21. In order to perform this test, we implement a fully
interacted specification (FIS) of Equation (2), by allowing any
coefficient to differ depending on whether individual i belongs
choose β̂1 as the best approximation to the real
impact of the AC economic cycle on the actual tax
enforcement policy. Otherwise, we can conclude
that this source of bias is not relevant.
As a final step of our identification strategy, we
perform a falsification test aimed at determining
the reliability of the results based on the filtering
process presented above. To this end, we employ
the same identification strategy to test cyclical-
ity in tax policy. Similarly, in order to define the
dependent variable, we employ another question
of the CIS’ repeated surveys: “Would you say that
what the Spaniards pay in taxes is a lot, regu-
lar or little?”22; again, this question has remained
unchanged over the 1994–2015 period. Analo-
gously to what we do for pijt, we code the answers
to this question into an ordered variable tijt,which
is scaled from “low tax pressure” (1) to “high tax
pressure” (3). This is a measure of the perceived
tax pressure t*ijt. By employing the same filter-
ing process, we then estimate a model analogous
to Equation (1), but employing tijt as dependent
variable. If our identification strategy is prop-
erly filtering the impact of the AC-specific eco-
nomic cycle on the actual policy, we would expect
results coherent with the hypothesis of acyclical
tax policy. Indeed, while the individual compo-
nent of t*ijt may well be either pro or counter-
cyclical according to changes in the individual
risk perception or demand, it is unlikely policy-
makers react to the AC-specific economic cycle
when it comes to statutory tax policy. This means
that, after having filtered t*ijt for all the individ-
ual confounders as well as for the structural and
common cyclical components, we expect a non-
statistically significant impact of the AC-specific
economic cycle on tax policy. This would corrob-
orate our identification strategy.
In the next section, we present some descrip-
tive statistics and detail the sources of the variable
included in the analysis.
C. Data and Sources
Our data set comprises information about
individual-level and AC-level variables for the
1994–2015 period. Our dependent variable,
including the one employed for the falsification
test, and all the individual-level control variables,
to group 1 or 2 (see Backus and Esteller-Moré 2017, 209 for
more details).
22. The original question in Spanish is “¿Diría Ud. que
lo que los/as españoles/as pagamos en impuestos es mucho,




Pooled Summary Statist ics
Variable Measurement unit Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
p Ranking 32,357 2.360 0.812 1 4
Falsification test dependent variable
t Ranking 35,152 2.607 0.542 1 3
Proxies of the Economic Cycle (main explanatory variables)
GDP (CA) Hundreds of billions of
euros
36,935 1.006 0.643 0.051 2.150
Unemployment (CA) Millions of people 36,935 0.427 0.425 0.005 2.186
AC-specific explanatory variables
Deficit (CA) Hundreds of billions of
euros
34,345 −0.010 0.021 −0.107 0.015
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector Share 36,935 0.219 0.073 0.076 0.441
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector Share 36,935 0.092 0.029 0.029 0.149
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector Share 36,935 0.647 0.076 0.416 0.827
Population (CA) Millions of people 34,345 4.606 2.488 0.263 8.450
Leftist government (CA) Dummy 36,935 0.352 0.478 0 1
Electoral cycle (CA) Dummy 36,935 0.277 0.447 0 1
TA employees per thousands of people Employees per thousands
of people
32,522 0.725 0.225 0.343 1.615
Individual-level explanatory variables
Dummy self-employed Dummy 36,946 0.147 0.354 0 1
Left Dummy 36,946 0.535 0.499 0 1
Female Dummy 36,946 0.422 0.494 0 1
Age Nr. of years 36,940 48.899 17.994 18 99
Age squared Nr. of years (squared) 36,9402, 714.857 1872.325 324 9, 801
Head of household Dummy 36,946 0.609 0.488 0 1
Dummy married Dummy 36,919 0.353 0.478 0 1
Education level Nr. of years 36,852 4.296 3.042 0 15
Nationalist Dummy 36,946 0.065 0.246 0 1
Municipality size Units 36,946 3.351 2.126 0 7
Municipality size squared Units squared 36,946 15.748 15.216 0 49
Dummy retired Dummy 36,946 0.329 0.470 0 1
Dummy public employee Dummy 36,946 0.171 0.376 0 1
Unemployment risk Probability 35,369 0.109 0.144 0 0.837
Dummy low Unemployment risk (mean) Dummy 36,946 0.621 0.485 0 1
Note: The dependent variables and all the individual-level control variables, are extracted from the repeated surveys waves
of the “Public opinion and public policy” annually published by the CIS. UR, and the relative dummy for low unemployment
risk have been estimated (see Section III.B). The GDP, the unemployment, the productive structure and the population of ACs
is provided by the INE. To define the total number of employees of the tax administration we rely both on information provided
by the Statistical Bulletins of the Central Personnel Registry and on information made available in the Report on the ceded taxes
to ACs published every year jointly with the project of the general State budget. Information on the electoral cycle and on the
political color of the government in office in any AC/year is available on the database of the Spanish Interior Ministry.
are extracted from the abovementioned repeated
waves of the annually published survey by the
CIS. The only exception is UR, and the related
dummy for low unemployment risk, which were
estimated using the methodology presented in
Section III.B.
Contextual variables refer to the 15 Spanish
“common regime” ACs and are obtained from
the following statistical sources. The informa-
tion about the GDP, the unemployment, the pro-
ductive structure, and the population of ACs is
provided by the Spanish National Institute of
Statistics (INE). The variable that controls for the
tax enforcement capacity—the total number of
employees of the tax administration—accounts
for the number of employees employed in both
AC-specific tax agencies and regional offices of
the national tax authority and it is relativized per
capita terms. This variable represents a measure
of the size of each tax agency with respect to the
population in any AC and year. In order to define
this variable, we rely both on information pro-
vided by the Statistical Bulletins of the Central
Personnel Registry (“Boletines Estadísticos del
Registro Central de Personal” in Spanish) and on
information made available in the Report on the
ceded taxes to ACs (“Informe sobre la cesión de
tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas” in Span-
ish) published every year jointly with the project
of the general State budget. Information on the
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics by UR Type
Panel A: High UR
Variable Measurement Unit Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
p Ranking 12,593 2.308 0.813 1 4
Falsification test dependent variable
t Ranking 13,478 2.632 0.531 1 3
Proxies of the Economic Cycle (main explanatory variables)
GDP (CA) Hundreds of billions of euros 13,984 1.020 0.638 0.051 2.150
Unemployment (CA) Millions of people 13,984 0.432 0.417 0.005 2.186
AC-specific explanatory variables
Deficit (CA) Hundreds of billions of euros 12,987 −0.011 0.022 −0.107 0.015
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector Share 13,984 0.219 0.074 0.076 0.441
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector Share 13,984 0.088 0.032 0.029 0.149
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector Share 13,984 0.652 0.075 0.416 0.827
Population (CA) Millions of people 12,987 4.691 2.492 0.263 8.450
Leftist government (CA) Dummy 13,984 0.341 0.474 0 1
Electoral cycle (CA) Dummy 13,984 0.321 0.467 0 1
TA employees per thousands of people Employees per thousands of
people
12,281 0.711 0.218 0.343 1.515
Individual-level explanatory variables
Dummy self-employed Dummy 13,990 0.111 0.314 0 1
Left Dummy 13,990 0.570 0.495 0 1
Female Dummy 13,990 0.425 0.494 0 1
Age Nr. of years 13,989 39.082 13.457 18 99
Age squared Nr. of years (squared) 13,989 1, 708.481 1, 188.069 324 9, 801
Head of household Dummy 13,990 0.516 0.500 0 1
Dummy married Dummy 13,980 0.419 0.493 0 1
Education level Nr. of years 13,971 4.495 4.951 0 99
Nationalist Dummy 13,990 0.060 0.237 0 1
Municipality size Units 13,990 3.381 2.018 0 7
Municipality size squared Units squared 13,990 15.505 14.465 0 49
Dummy Retired Dummy 13,990 0.051 0.219 0 1
Dummy public employee Dummy 13,990 0.108 0.310 0 1
Unemployment risk Probability 12,413 0.254 0.155 0 0.837
Panel B: Low UR
Variable Measurement Unit Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
p Ranking 19,764 2.393 0.809 1 4
Falsification test dependent variable
t Ranking 21,674 2.591 0.548 1 3
Proxies of the Economic Cycle (main explanatory variables)
GDP (CA) Hundreds of billions of euros 22,951 0.997 0.646 0.051 2.150
Unemployment (CA) Millions of people 22,951 0.423 0.431 0.005 2.186
AC-specific explanatory variables
Deficit (CA) Hundreds of billions of euros 21,358 −0.010 0.020 −0.107 0.015
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector Share 22,951 0.220 0.073 0.076 0.441
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector Share 22,951 0.094 0.026 0.030 0.149
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector Share 22,951 0.644 0.076 0.416 0.827
Population (CA) Millions of people 21,358 4.555 2.485 0.263 8.450
Leftist government (CA) Dummy 22,951 0.360 0.480 0 1
Electoral cycle (CA) Dummy 22,951 0.250 0.433 0 1
TA employees per thousands of people Employees per thousands of
people
20,241 0.733 0.229 0.343 1.615
Individual-level explanatory variables
Dummy self-employed Dummy 22,956 0.169 0.375 0 1
Left Dummy 22,956 0.514 0.500 0 1
Female Dummy 22,956 0.421 0.494 0 1
Age Nr. of years 22,951 54.882 17.784 18 99
Age squared Nr. of years (squared) 22,951 3, 328.259 1946.403 324 9, 801
Head of household Dummy 22,956 0.665 0.472 0 1
Dummy married Dummy 22,939 0.312 0.463 0 1
Education level Nr. of years 22,951 4.464 5.220 0 99
Nationalist Dummy 22,956 0.068 0.252 0 1
Municipality size Units 22,956 3.332 2.189 0 7
Municipality size squared Units squared 22,956 15.896 15.654 0 49
Dummy Retired Dummy 22,956 0.498 0.500 0 1
Dummy public employee Dummy 22,956 0.209 0.406 0 1




Panel C: Means Difference High UR – Low UR
Variable Mean High UR Mean Low UR Difference p Value
Dependent variable
p 2.308 2.393 −0.085 .000***
Falsification test dependent variable
t 2.632 2.591 0.041 .000***
Proxies of the Economic Cycle (main explanatory variables)
GDP (CA) 1.020 0.997 0.023 .001***
Unemployment (CA) 0.432 0.423 0.009 .040**
AC-specific explanatory variables
Deficit (CA) −0.011 −0.010 −0.001 .000***
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector 0.219 0.220 −0.001 .312
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector 0.088 0.094 −0.006 .000***
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector 0.652 0.644 0.008 .000***
Population (CA) 4.691 4.555 0.136 .000***
Leftist government (CA) 0.341 0.360 −0.019 .000***
Electoral cycle (CA) 0.321 0.250 0.071 .000***
TA employees per thousands of people 0.711 0.733 −0.022 .000***
Individual-level explanatory variables
Dummy self-employed 0.111 0.169 −0.058 .000***
Left 0.570 0.514 0.056 .000***
Female 0.425 0.421 0.005 .365
Age 39.082 54.882 −15.800 .000***
Age squared 1,708.481 3,328.259 −1,619.778 .000***
Head of household 0.516 0.665 −0.150 .000***
Dummy married 2.0000 0.419 0.312 .107
Education level 4.495 4.464 0.031 .576
Nationalist 0.060 0.068 −0.008 .002***
Municipality size 3.381 3.332 0.049 .032**
Municipality size squared 15.505 15.896 −0.391 .017**
Dummy retired 0.051 0.498 −0.447 .000***
Dummy public employee 0.108 0.209 −0.101 .000***
Unemployment risk 0.254 0.031 0.223 .000***
Note: The dependent variables and all the individual-level control variables, are extracted from the repeated surveys waves of the “Public
opinion and public policy” annually published by the CIS. UR, and the relative dummy for low unemployment risk have been estimated (see
Section III.B). The GDP, the unemployment, the productive structure and the population of ACs is provided by the INE. To define the total
number of employees of the tax administration we rely both on information provided by the Statistical Bulletins of the Central Personnel Registry
and on information made available in the Report on the ceded taxes to ACs published every year jointly with the project of the general State
budget. Information on the electoral cycle and on the political color of the government in office in any AC/year is available on the database of the
Spanish Interior Ministry.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
electoral cycle and on the political color of the
government in office in any AC/year is available
on the database of the Spanish Interior Ministry.
Table 1 reports the pooled summary statistics of
the variables employed in our empirical analy-
sis, while Table 2 presents the descriptive statis-
tics referred to the two subsamples defined on the
basis of the dummy “low UR” (panels A and B)
and a test for the equality of subsamples means
(Panel C).




Table 3 presents the results of the estimation
of Equation (1). In particular, in columns 1–3,
we measure the economic cycle through GDPjt,
while in columns 4–6, we use Unemploymentjt.
The structure of the table is coherent with the
filtering process presented in our estimation strat-
egy. More precisely, columns 1 and 4 estimate the
baseline model presented in Equation (1) includ-
ing fixed and time effects, columns 2 and 5 sub-
stitute standard fixed effects with 5-year fixed
effects and finally in columns 3 and 6, we add
the interaction between any individual variable
and the time dummies. In every model, the proxy
for the economic cycle is highly significant and
presents a sign that is coherent with a pooled
counter-cyclical perceived tax enforcement.
Regarding our filtering process, by substitut-
ing standard fixed effects with 5-year fixed effects
has a significant impact on the magnitude of the
coefficients of the economic cycle, while intro-
ducing the interactions between individual vari-
ables and time dummies has a negligible if not
null impact. This seems to suggest that the indi-
vidual component of the perception/demand of
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TABLE 3
The Determinants of Perceived Tax Enforcement Along Time. Ordered-Probit, 1994–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP (CA) −0.409*** −0.788*** −0.770***
(−3.695) (−3.861) (−3.622)
Unemployment (CA) 0.180*** 0.202*** 0.202***
(4.361) (3.365) (3.126)
Deficit (CA) 1.901** 1.006 1.138 1.663** 1.270 1.387
(2.396) (0.814) (0.885) (2.171) (1.029) (1.080)
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector 1.327 −0.590 −0.707 0.200 −1.955 −1.923
(1.469) (−0.417) (−0.470) (0.226) (−1.327) (−1.238)
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector −1.292 0.983 1.372 −1.049 0.590 1.126
(−1.163) (0.494) (0.661) (−0.952) (0.296) (0.540)
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector 2.450** 2.718* 2.668* 1.860* 2.010 2.077
(2.452) (1.750) (1.653) (1.875) (1.271) (1.269)
Leftist government (CA) 0.011 0.024 −0.008 0.017 0.047 0.013
(0.448) (0.638) (−0.203) (0.717) (1.233) (0.345)
Electoral cycle (CA) −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 0.003 0.001
(−0.209) (−0.177) (−0.276) (−0.159) (0.148) (0.076)
TA employees per thousands of people −0.412*** −0.398*** −0.439*** −0.399*** −0.390*** −0.432***
(−7.048) (−6.603) (−7.192) (−6.813) (−6.450) (−7.060)
Population (CA) 0.165*** 0.223 0.190 −0.011 −0.061 −0.077
(2.659) (1.567) (1.272) (−0.281) (−0.486) (−0.578)
Municipality size −0.086*** −0.085*** −0.033 −0.087*** −0.085*** −0.033
(−4.719) (−4.607) (−0.369) (−4.752) (−4.623) (−0.368)
Municipality size squared 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005
(4.048) (3.854) (0.423) (4.075) (3.860) (0.422)
Left −0.037*** −0.035*** −0.195*** −0.037*** −0.034*** −0.195***
(−2.772) (−2.596) (−2.854) (−2.758) (−2.583) (−2.854)
Female −0.008 −0.007 −0.065 −0.008 −0.007 −0.065
(−0.562) (−0.496) (−0.946) (−0.553) (−0.497) (−0.946)
Age −0.005** −0.004* −0.018 −0.005** −0.004* −0.018
(−1.965) (−1.929) (−1.451) (−1.977) (−1.920) (−1.451)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(2.802) (2.766) (1.505) (2.815) (2.766) (1.506)
Head of household 0.013 0.015 −0.009 0.013 0.015 −0.009
(0.813) (0.982) (−0.123) (0.844) (0.984) (−0.122)
Dummy married −0.023 −0.024 −0.033 −0.023 −0.023 −0.032
(−1.518) (−1.555) (−0.366) (−1.497) (−1.518) (−0.364)
Dummy self-employed 0.044* 0.045** 0.109 0.043* 0.044* 0.109
(1.925) (1.961) (0.961) (1.894) (1.937) (0.962)
Dummy Retired −0.015 −0.013 −0.223 −0.015 −0.014 −0.223
(−0.576) (−0.520) (−1.617) (−0.574) (−0.536) (−1.618)
Dummy public employee −0.032* −0.029 0.018 −0.032* −0.029 0.018
(−1.728) (−1.564) (0.193) (−1.714) (−1.564) (0.194)
Dummy low Unemployment risk (mean) 0.044** 0.042** 0.136 0.044** 0.042** 0.136
(2.341) (2.240) (1.443) (2.334) (2.243) (1.442)
Education level 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001
(5.161) (5.196) (0.165) (5.137) (5.181) (0.164)
Nationalist 0.076*** 0.069** −0.009 0.077*** 0.071** −0.009
(2.650) (2.404) (−0.059) (2.664) (2.449) (−0.059)
Observations 28,384 28,384 28,384 28,384 28,384 28,384
Log-likelihood −32,875.604 −32,793.128 −32,554.447 −32,872.955 −32,795.524 −32,556.497
Fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE×5 years TE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual_Var.s×TE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: z statistics are reported in parentheses and are derived using robust standard errors. We do not employ standard errors
clustered at regional level, since we have too many regressors in comparison to clusters. The theory that justifies the calculation
of cluster standard errors is asymptotic in the number of clusters, and the established rule is to employ a number of clusters that
at least equates the number of estimated variables. Otherwise, one needs to consider whether any of the reported standard errors
means anything. However, we use Fixed Effects (or even 5 years FE) at regional level which control for most of the
within-cluster correlation of the error.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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tax enforcement does not vary much along the
economic cycle. For these reasons, and in order
to be able to more easily interpret the effect of rel-
evant individual variables, we choose the results
for 5-year fixed effects (columns 2 and 5) as our
best estimates for the pooled regression. Further
analyses presented in Tables 4 and 5 are based on
these models.
As explained in detail in Section III.B, the
control variables have been included as part of
our identification strategy. Thus, the interpreta-
tion of their impact on the dependent variable
is not key for the purpose of this paper. Nev-
ertheless, it is interesting to stress some results.
In particular, regions with a higher percentage of
GVA generated by the tertiary sector tend to have
higher perceived tax enforcement. The capac-
ity of tax administration to enforce the exist-
ing tax legislation seems to be oversized as the
coefficient of the TA employees per thousands
of people variable suggests. The impact of size
of the municipality in which the respondent to
the survey resides is reported to be nonlinear as
the impact of the age of the respondent. Left-
ist voters report a lower perceived level of tax
enforcement suggesting a demand for a more
stringent fight against fiscal fraud. On the other
hand, being a voter of a regional nationalist party
has the opposite effect on the individual percep-
tion/demand. Self-employed individuals report a
higher level of perceived tax enforcement which
is coherent with the higher probability they have
to be audited. Finally, individuals employed in
the public sector tend to report a lower level
of perceived tax enforcement, while people with
a lower estimated expected unemployment rate
show the opposite effect.
Following our identification strategy, Table 4
presents the results of the estimation of sepa-
rate regressions for different groups of individu-
als based on their UR-type. In particular, columns
1 and 2 replicate model 2 of Table 3 for low-UR
type and high-UR type individuals, respectively.
Similarly, columns 3 and 4 reproduce model 5
of Table 3 for the same clusters of individu-
als. The results show perceived counter-cyclical
tax enforcement for both clusters of individuals.
Testing for significantly different coefficients for
these two groups lead to rejecting this hypothe-
sis, so we maintain the results shown in model
2 and 5 of Table 3 as best approximation to the
pooled effect of the economic cycle on perceived
tax enforcement.
Hence, thus far, our study confirms the exis-
tence of a fiscal capacity argument in the setting
of enforcement (generally corroborating the
results obtained by Chen 2017), but as a novelty
it relates this result to economic cyclical shocks.
Indeed, our results implicitly suggest that, on
average, tax revenue losses due to the economic
downturn tend to be accompanied by perceived
tougher enforcement. Next, we try to disentangle
whether the severity of the economic downturn
affects perceived tax enforcement.
In this vein, Table 5 presents the results of the
analysis of the presence of potential nonlinear-
ity. More specifically, columns 1–4 are related to
Equation (2). Columns 1 and 2 employ a linear
spline methodology with equally spaced knots;
columns 3 and 4 use a linear spline methodology
with knots at specified extreme points (i.e., first
and fifth percentiles for the GDP based model
and 95th and 99th percentiles for the unemploy-
ment based model); and columns 5 and 6 present
the results of the estimation of Equation (3) that
employs an orthogonalized third degree poly-
nomial to account for nonlinearity in the eco-
nomic cycle.
These results seem to suggest a change in
the perceived behavior of tax administration.
Namely, the models that employ linear spline
with equally spaced knots do not show a change
in the sign of the slope, but we can at least appre-
ciate a change in the slope magnitude. A draw-
back of this approach is that in order to iden-
tify the change in the economic cycle employ-
ing knots, they are equally spaced. By using lin-
ear spline models with knots at specified extreme
points that identify severe financial constraints,
though, we are able to appreciate a significant
change in the slope of perceived tax enforcement
to the economic cycle. More specifically, column
3 (4) show that for very low (high) values of
GDP (unemployment) taxpayers’ perception of
tax enforcement policy turns out to be procycli-
cal while remaining counter-cyclical for the rest
of the economic cycle. We obtain a similar effect
also for the results related to Equation (3) but
just for what concerns the unemployment-based
model (column 6).
In the online appendix, we present the
results of our robustness analyses. In particu-
lar, Tables A1 to A6, Supporting Information,
replicate Tables 3–5 by alternatively employing
3 years or 10 years fixed effects instead of 5 years
fixed effects in order to account for potentially
different economic cycles. Results remain qual-
itatively unchanged. Online Tables A7 to A12
present the results obtained by replicating the
analysis presented in Tables 3–5 by estimating
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TABLE 4
The Determinants of Perceived Tax Enforcement Along Time. Ordered-Probit, 1994–2015; Separate
Regressions by UR Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low UR High UR Low UR High UR
GDP (CA) −0.782*** −0.793**
(−3.038) (−2.282)
Unemployment (CA) 0.171** 0.241**
(2.286) (2.311)
Deficit (CA) −0.752 3.409* −0.501 3.724*
(−0.463) (1.755) (−0.309) (1.925)
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector −1.131 1.618 −2.158 −0.384
(−0.665) (0.607) (−1.222) (−0.138)
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector −1.339 5.774 −1.691 5.338
(−0.546) (1.625) (−0.687) (1.498)
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector 3.366* 2.907 2.779 1.989
(1.775) (1.019) (1.437) (0.685)
Leftist government (CA) −0.010 0.099 0.010 0.121*
(−0.220) (1.568) (0.200) (1.930)
Electoral cycle (CA) 0.005 −0.026 0.011 −0.021
(0.195) (−0.799) (0.459) (−0.652)
TA employees per thousands of people −0.386*** −0.433*** −0.378*** −0.423***
(−5.042) (−4.328) (−4.924) (−4.223)
Population (CA) 0.029 0.467** −0.232 0.166
(0.149) (1.993) (−1.337) (0.790)
Municipality size −0.087*** −0.069** −0.087*** −0.068**
(−3.734) (−2.258) (−3.757) (−2.239)
Municipality size squared 0.009*** 0.007* 0.009*** 0.007*
(3.149) (1.850) (3.154) (1.834)
Left −0.050*** −0.012 −0.050*** −0.012
(−2.935) (−0.561) (−2.927) (−0.540)
Female −0.015 0.003 −0.015 0.003
(−0.799) (0.120) (−0.791) (0.113)
Age −0.007** −0.001 −0.007** −0.001
(−2.125) (−0.254) (−2.116) (−0.234)
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(3.079) (0.391) (3.073) (0.376)
Head of household 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.012
(0.771) (0.507) (0.770) (0.497)
Dummy married −0.002 −0.058** −0.002 −0.057**
(−0.113) (−2.514) (−0.105) (−2.463)
Dummy self-employed 0.038 0.069 0.038 0.068
(1.449) (1.341) (1.426) (1.325)
Dummy retired −0.032 0.054 −0.032 0.052
(−1.004) (0.773) (−1.009) (0.743)
Dummy public employee −0.034 −0.005 −0.034 −0.004
(−1.551) (−0.141) (−1.564) (−0.112)
Education level 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(3.583) (3.703) (3.570) (3.696)
Nationalist 0.091** 0.031 0.091** 0.033
(2.477) (0.641) (2.482) (0.689)
Observations 17,371 11,013 17,371 11,013
Log-likelihood −20,002.242 −12,705.151 −20,004.539 −12,705.350
Fixed Effects No No No No
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE×5 years TE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual_Var.s×TE No No No No
Note: z statistics are reported in parentheses and are derived using robust standard errors.
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TABLE 6
Falsification Test—The Determinants of Perceived Tax Pressure Along Time. Ordered-Probit,
1994–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP (CA) 0.256** −0.050 −0.097
(2.084) (−0.230) (−0.423)
Unemployment (CA) −0.134*** −0.043 −0.078
(−2.813) (−0.634) (−1.070)
Deficit (CA) 1.563* 1.983 1.446 1.600* 1.971 1.434
(1.799) (1.454) (1.015) (1.915) (1.445) (1.006)
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector −0.727 −0.687 −1.808 0.005 −0.404 −1.325
(−0.738) (−0.446) (−1.100) (0.005) (−0.253) (−0.782)
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector 0.754 −0.456 −2.329 0.613 −0.321 −2.040
(0.633) (−0.211) (−1.024) (0.522) (−0.148) (−0.892)
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector −0.706 −1.195 −2.511 −0.342 −0.950 −2.105
(−0.642) (−0.689) (−1.383) (−0.314) (−0.538) (−1.142)
Leftist government (CA) −0.032 −0.019 −0.003 −0.037 −0.023 −0.009
(−1.173) (−0.464) (−0.068) (−1.362) (−0.540) (−0.199)
Electoral cycle (CA) 0.005 −0.003 0.006 0.005 −0.001 0.010
(0.229) (−0.141) (0.280) (0.232) (−0.059) (0.433)
TA employees per thousands of people −0.154** −0.176*** −0.172** −0.163** −0.180*** −0.177***
(−2.350) (−2.601) (−2.496) (−2.488) (−2.644) (−2.577)
Population (CA) −0.134* 0.027 0.103 −0.024 0.014 0.083
(−1.941) (0.169) (0.617) (−0.565) (0.101) (0.550)
Municipality size 0.041** 0.046** −0.017 0.042** 0.046** −0.017
(2.043) (2.238) (−0.165) (2.072) (2.246) (−0.166)
Municipality size squared −0.005** −0.006** −0.000 −0.005** −0.006** −0.000
(−2.134) (−2.357) (−0.027) (−2.166) (−2.370) (−0.026)
Left −0.164*** −0.165*** −0.092 −0.164*** −0.165*** −0.092
(−11.245) (−11.307) (−1.248) (−11.258) (−11.302) (−1.248)
Female 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.131* 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.131*
(11.955) (11.974) (1.680) (11.962) (11.978) (1.680)
Age 0.006** 0.006** −0.011 0.006** 0.006** −0.011
(2.171) (2.282) (−0.743) (2.173) (2.276) (−0.743)
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000 −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000
(−2.799) (−2.916) (0.678) (−2.803) (−2.910) (0.678)
Head of household 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.017
(0.597) (0.595) (0.219) (0.593) (0.597) (0.219)
Dummy married −0.017 −0.018 −0.123 −0.018 −0.018 −0.123
(−1.024) (−1.077) (−1.238) (−1.052) (−1.081) (−1.239)
Dummy self-employed 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.078 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.078
(4.207) (4.149) (0.662) (4.223) (4.157) (0.662)
Dummy retired 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.196 0.153*** 0.154*** 0.196
(5.463) (5.487) (1.342) (5.456) (5.484) (1.342)
Dummy public employee −0.150*** −0.152*** −0.404*** −0.150*** −0.152*** −0.404***
(−7.476) (−7.557) (−3.944) (−7.479) (−7.554) (−3.945)
Dummy low Unemployment risk (mean) −0.128*** −0.128*** −0.117 −0.128*** −0.128*** −0.117
(−6.132) (−6.110) (−1.148) (−6.128) (−6.108) (−1.148)
Education level −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.020* −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.020*
(−8.695) (−8.596) (−1.647) (−8.678) (−8.595) (−1.647)
Nationalist −0.009 −0.008 −0.302* −0.010 −0.008 −0.302*
(−0.272) (−0.237) (−1.683) (−0.280) (−0.243) (−1.683)
Observations 30,891 30,891 30,891 30,891 30,891 30,891
Log-likelihood −22,641.947 −22,598.572 −22,339.425 −22,640.050 −22,598.391 −22,338.923
Fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE×5 years TE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual_Var.s×TE No No Yes No No Yes
Note: z statistics are reported in parentheses and are derived using robust standard errors.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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TABLE 7
Falsification Test—The Determinants of Perceived Tax Pressure Along Time. Ordered-Probit,
1994–2015; Separate Regressions by UR Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low UR High UR Low UR High UR
GDP (CA) 0.257 −0.528
(0.916) (−1.475)
Unemployment (CA) −0.042 −0.071
(−0.497) (−0.598)
Deficit (CA) 3.680** −0.342 3.627** −0.174
(2.070) (−0.158) (2.038) (−0.080)
FYL_%GVA_Secondary_sector 1.103 −3.496 1.343 −2.848
(0.590) (−1.245) (0.697) (−0.963)
FYL_%GVA_Construction_sector −0.169 −1.808 −0.112 −1.433
(−0.063) (−0.471) (−0.042) (−0.372)
FYL_% GVA_Tertiary_sector 0.722 −5.000 0.836 −4.216
(0.340) (−1.611) (0.387) (−1.332)
Leftist government (CA) −0.072 0.078 −0.077 0.079
(−1.392) (1.118) (−1.474) (1.115)
Electoral cycle (CA) −0.032 0.056 −0.035 0.065*
(−1.185) (1.532) (−1.276) (1.811)
TA employees per thousands of people −0.268*** −0.019 −0.269*** −0.024
(−3.200) (−0.159) (−3.204) (−0.204)
Population (CA) −0.028 0.205 0.057 0.051
(−0.135) (0.783) (0.301) (0.216)
Municipality size 0.077*** −0.010 0.077*** −0.009
(3.033) (−0.293) (3.036) (−0.268)
Municipality size squared −0.009*** −0.000 −0.009*** −0.000
(−2.937) (−0.034) (−2.933) (−0.064)
Left −0.189*** −0.127*** −0.189*** −0.127***
(−10.221) (−5.294) (−10.227) (−5.276)
Female 0.212*** 0.171*** 0.212*** 0.170***
(10.219) (6.426) (10.221) (6.404)
Age 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(1.161) (0.926) (1.161) (0.914)
Age squared −0.000* −0.000 −0.000* −0.000
(−1.771) (−1.072) (−1.773) (−1.061)
Head of household −0.005 0.037 −0.005 0.037
(−0.230) (1.299) (−0.226) (1.301)
Dummy married 0.018 −0.077*** 0.018 −0.077***
(0.804) (−2.979) (0.801) (−2.988)
Dummy self-employed 0.135*** 0.010 0.135*** 0.010
(4.556) (0.182) (4.559) (0.174)
Dummy retired 0.161*** 0.181** 0.161*** 0.179**
(4.669) (2.261) (4.674) (2.232)
Dummy public employee −0.141*** −0.176*** −0.141*** −0.176***
(−5.945) (−4.396) (−5.940) (−4.404)
Education level −0.018*** −0.016*** −0.018*** −0.016***
(−7.017) (−5.100) (−7.011) (−5.099)
Nationalist 0.013 −0.046 0.013 −0.045
(0.300) (−0.828) (0.299) (−0.808)
Observations 19,074 11,817 19,074 11,817
Log-likelihood −14,130.416 −8,392.347 −14,130.725 −8,393.204
Fixed effects No No No No
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE×5 years TE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual_Var.s×TE No No No No
Note: z statistics are reported in parentheses and are derived using robust standard errors.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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Equations (1)–(3) by means of ordered logit
and OLS models, respectively. Again, the results
qualitative results do not change.
B. Falsification Test
Table 6 presents the results obtained by per-
forming a falsification test consisting in estimat-
ing Equation (1) by substituting the perceived
tax enforcement for the perceived tax pressure
as dependent variable. As expected, results sug-
gest that tax policy does not react to AC-specific
economic cycle. Indeed, in the baseline models
(columns 1 and 4), where the filtering process is
not completely taking into account all the com-
ponents of the dependent variable, the economic
cycle seems to affect the tax policy as it is per-
ceived by taxpayers in a procyclical way. This
effect, though, vanishes as the filtering process is
fully implemented. Table 7 furthers this falsifica-
tion test by allowing the effect of the economic
cycle to be different based on the individual risk
type. Results fail to show a significant impact of
the economic cycle on tax policy both for high-
and low-risk individuals. These results validate
the reliability of our identification strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Despite a strand of the literature on public
finance acknowledges tax enforcement is an addi-
tional parameter of an optimal fiscal system (see
e.g., Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014), there is lit-
tle literature checking whether this is the case.
That is, there are not many positive analyses aim-
ing at explaining how tax enforcement evolves
along the economic cycle. This is the challenge
of this paper.
In particular, we estimate, first, if perceived
tax enforcement depends on the state of the econ-
omy, and if so, second, estimate its nature (pro or
counter-cyclical). To do so, we have used survey
data, as a proxy of real efforts by the tax admin-
istration and tried to filter any other potential
(individual) explanation in the survey responses
that might bias our dependent variable. From the
analysis, we conclude that the perceived level of
enforcement is cyclical with the nature of the
response dependent on the severity of the crisis.
These results confirm those of Chen (2017) while
extending those findings to subnational regions
and severity of economic crisis. It would be inter-
esting to test this result using administrative data
on tax enforcement effort as well as in other con-
texts, where the institutional design of the tax
administration is different from the Spanish one.
Finally, we think this line of research might merit
further theoretical developments.
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APPENDIX S1: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
